digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Articles & Chapters

2003

Poverty, Welfare, and the Affirmative State
[comments]
Frank W. Munger
New York Law School, frank.munger@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
Recommended Citation
Law & Society Review, Vol. 37, Issue 3 (2003), pp. 659-686

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

Review Essay

Poverty, Welfare, and the Affirmative State
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Progressive Ethnography of Poverty

Ethnographic study of American poverty from the Progressive
Era to the present has provided a sympathetic window on the lives
of the poor. Ethnographers bear witness to the world of need,
oppression, and survival, but the best ethnography has always
provided more than the stark facts of life in poverty. Carol Stack,
Elliott Liebow, Joyce Ladner, and earlier generations of scholars
helped us do more than put faces on the poor; their mission was to
understand poverty in its social and institutional context-how the
institutions of a democratic society create poverty and limit the
capacity of the poor to participate fully in social life. Their
scholarship grew first from a powerful moral and political
principle: unless such institutions "work" for the poor as well as
the better off, we cannot say that the poor have received an equal
opportunity to become autonomous, successful participants in our
society. Second, their scholarship exposes the myth of universal
citizenship rights in the American welfare state, revealing such
rights to be contingent upon identity.
Recent work in this tradition is taking another important step
toward a deeper understanding of inequality by connecting the
Law & Society Review, Volume 37, Number 3 (2003)
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lives of the poor to the lives of all citizens of the welfare state,
demonstrating the interdependence of poverty and wealth, market
and social provision, and political power and governmental
regulation of the poor. John Gilliom's interpretive study of welfare recipients' narratives is an important addition to the new
ethnographic research on poverty. His interviews show us how-in
the words of historian Michael Katz-poor women "navigate the
welfare state from below" (personal correspondence with Michael
Katz). The narratives of poor mothers about oversight by welfare
officials are important not only because they tell of a world of need
and oppression but also because they help us understand how
poverty policy is no backwater of programs for marginal citizens
but an integral part of the welfare state in an age when the rhetoric
of policy connects all of its elements to the market and to
globalization. Narratives of these regulated lives help us gain a better understanding of citizenship, identity, social participation -and
the role of law-in contemporary society.
In this review essay, I describe Gilliom's research in relation to
recent books by Katz and Alice O'Connor. Katz and O'Connor's
studies situate poverty policy in the evolution of the American
welfare state from the early twentieth century to the present.
Together, the three studies tell complementary stories about
poverty policy. Gilliom provides a compelling account of the
capture of administrators and regulatees alike by a system of
information control in welfare offices; he examines compliance and
subversion and draws our attention to their implications for
democratic citizenship. Katz's wider lens suggests that Gilliom's
account of surveillance and discipline is fundamental to both public
and private institutions of the American welfare state, which are, by
their nature, sites of surveillance and discipline that maintain
subservience to the needs of the private labor market. O'Connor
describes the failure of poverty scholars from the Progressive Era
to the present to create "poverty knowledge" that describes the
alliance of welfare policy and labor market discipline that
stereotypes and stigmatizes recipients. The failure of liberal
mainstream American scholars to emphasize these distortions of
the moral image of welfare recipients has limited their ability to
challenge the legitimacy of welfare policies.
Scholars of poverty and the welfare state, like these three,
examine the past but also anticipate a possible future. By learning
from history, Katz and O'Connor hope that a way will be found to
restore an affirmative welfare state. Their histories suggest,
however, that nostalgia for past visions of the welfare state may
also be a trap. America has a long political history of limiting
redistributive policies to the morally deserving. The dynamics that
underlie present welfare politics and welfare policies must be
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replaced by new visions of democratic participation that find a
place for the voice of those who need (and support) a more
affirmative state. Recent law and society research has adopted a
more critical stance than much of the mainstream poverty research
that O'Connor describes. Notwithstanding their critical perspective, these sociolegal scholars have often faced the dilemma of
choosing between pursuing critique and maintaining "relevance."
Choosing to focus on the political dynamics of the welfare state
itself may be a promising way to escape these alternatives. Scholars
such as Gilliom are helping to identify new audiences among the
citzenry and new discourses in which to address them that will
stimulate political participation and change.

The Politics of Surveillance and Resistance
In Overseers of the Poor, Gilliom reminds the reader why the
welfare state observed through the experiences of welfare
recipients holds universal lessons. Citizens have become accustomed to surveillance by means once considered Orwellian[g]lobal positioning satellites; trackable cars and cell phones;
closed-circuit television cameras in parks and streets; computer
data matching of banking, insurance, and taxation records;
"cookies" and other ways of monitoring Internet activity; the
drug testing of students, workers, and welfare clients: all are now
more or less routine parts of American life. (xii)

Likewise, citizens have become accustomed to the "sadly deficient"
public discourse of threats to their privacy rights and, Gilliom
argues, have found better ways of talking about surveillance and its
effects on their lives and relationships with others.
Poor women's subordination through intrusive surveillance
resonates with experiences widely shared among citizens of the
welfare state. The women's lives are extraordinarily stressful and
difficult, and their well-being as well as that of their children is
vulnerable beyond the experience of most of us. Yet they exemplify
a universal, identity-shaping attribute of welfare state citizenship-subordination to the regimes of surveillance required in
exchange for the very means to maintain an ordinary and secure
life.
The women who speak in Overseers eloquently describe their
subordination to surveillance and its effects, but Gilliom's pathbreaking insight is that the women's narratives also hold the
promise of resistance. The increasing powers of surveillance that
bind citizens to the welfare state's central institutions of employment, market, and governance demand a broadly based politics of
resistance to excessive intrusion. The women's discourse of care
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counters the powerful effects of surveillance. Their narratives not
only illustrate a localized practice that blunts the effects of
surveillance but also hold the further promise, argues Gilliom,
that such local antisurveillance languages and practices will
coalesce into a more powerful public discourse of autonomy and
resistance to intrusion.
Dependency as Subordination
Dependency, say recent welfare reformers, sets the welfare
recipient apart from the mainstream. Women on welfare bear
the stigma of dependency. The term implies reliance on the
collective resources of the community and, more negatively, a
moral failure to become self-sufficient. Historically, the able-bodied
poor were suspect and subjected to harsh treatment intended to
reform the beggar and motivate the idle to work. Poor able-bodied
men are still highly suspect, and they receive little aid under
contemporary policies of poor relief. Poor mothers, who are
harder to ignore because of the children they care foi, are
nevertheless stigmatized for their failure to work or, equivalently,
failure to form a relationship with a working male. Back-to-thefuture welfare reform has emphasized requiring poor mothers to
work, even if work leaves them poor and their children
unattended, continuing a pattern that has characterized welfare
since Elizabethan times.
Critics of welfare reform challenge the stereotypes of welfare
dependency. Their research demonstrates that poor mothers
possess a work ethic, and indeed, most have always worked and
struggled to maintain self-sufficiency. Indeed, welfare reform itself
should have removed the stigma of nonwork since the vast majority
of those who left welfare after 1996 do work, although most remain
poor (see Schram 2002).
The distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor
continues to defeat a more just and effective poverty relief policy.
Harsh and intrusive welfare policies reflect an entrenched moral
politics of the labor market that associates a woman's "good" moral
identity with work or marriage to a man who works. Whether or
not the majority of Americans agree with the values of capitalism
and patriarchy expressed by these policies, they are given little
choice. Katz (in The Priceof Citizenship, discussed later) describes the
relationship between the public and private components of the
American welfare state that politically divides workers by creating a
financial stake for most employees in maintaining a symbolic
distinction between themselves and those who receive public
benefits-even as their own privately financed employment
security and benefits decline. Thus, the politics of welfare and
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the dependence of most workers on private welfare benefits
are interlocked and unlikely to change unless dependency itself
is understood differently and the identity of the poor is
transformed.
Overseers of the Poor offers an alternative understanding of the
universality of dependency, one that is unencumbered by the
moral politics of welfare. Gilliom understands dependency not as
illicit neediness, but as subordination arising from legitimate need.
Poor women must subject themselves to a regime of public
supervision. Thus, their dependency is a form of subordination
constructed by welfare law. But such dependency by law is not
unique to poor women.' Public and private surveillance is a
universal fact of contemporary welfare state citizenship. Government requires a flow of information in exchange for its licenses, its
tax deductions, its regulation, its subsidies, and its public benefits.
Employers backed by the power of dismissal engage in
surveillance for drugs, for union activity, for disloyalty, and for
entitlement to benefits such as workers' compensation or medical
treatment. Information extraction in exchange for essential benefits is ubiquitous. Although surveillance may be legitimate"voluntarily" exchanged or "democratically" imposed so that one
can qualify for employment, benefits, or services-surveillance is
inherently an instrument of power and a characteristic of the
welfare state.
Gilliom is well aware of the long history of state surveillance
associated with the provision of benefits. Overseers of the Poor helps
us understand that state surveillance and public provision for
welfare were created by the same impulse. 2 Thus, the problems

1 Viewed in this way, the recipients of social insurance such as Social Security and
recipients of public benefits such as welfare, although viewed in categorically different
moral terms, experience regimes of subordination that differ only in degree. More
generally, Reich (1964) noted the near universality of dependency by law, for nearly all
citizens receive benefits from the government through social insurance and public benefit
programs, public education, licenses, public employment, and a wide variety of services.
Reich argued that the benefits provided by government are so pervasive and foundational
for civil society that their security must be viewed as fundamental, akin to the security
historically presumed for property interests. He deemed public largesse the "new
property," but in truth his landmark claims foregrounded the ongoing struggle over the
terms and conditions of governmental benefits, which, in recent years, increasingly
subordinate the privacy and security of individual benefit holders to the collective interests
of the polity.
2 The tension that his research foregrounds between provision for the needs of
impoverished mothers and oppressive surveillance is not a product of contemporary
retrenchment, for the two were thoroughly linked from welfare's inception. Yet the tension
around rights may indeed be something new, a product of an intervening era of economic
prosperity and civil rights in which entitlement to equal quality of life has grown and
spread in the American sensibility.
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associated with the surveillance of welfare recipients through an
encircling net of computer databases and interview checkpoints are
not the result of some dark ministry. Nor are they the product of
the arbitrary administration of rules intended for a more benign
purpose, or a byproduct of the discriminatory and biased actions of
caseworkers alone. As Katz's broad history of twentieth-century
welfare makes clear, surveillance and control originated in the
conception of the mixed welfare state that promotes participation
in a market society. Further, as O'Connor shows us, surveillance is
also the product of theories of poverty articulated by scholars that
reinforce the importance of differences between deserving and
undeserving poor.
The embedding of surveillance in the welfare state is illustrated
by the particular experiences of welfare recipients. Because
welfare programs presume that poor mothers are morally suspect,
benefits are based on degrees of rectitude and submission to
disciplinary measures intended to force recipients to work
and to "responsibilize" their parenting (see Rose 1999). Thus,
American welfare providers have always deployed the power of
surveillance to make judgments about the behavior (read deserving
or undeserving character) of recipients, requiring detailed and
intimate information about family and cohabitation, as well as
about means of subsistence and personal needs. Thus, surveillance practices have required recipients of welfare to negotiate
their moral identity with the providers to whom they are
subordinate.
Gilliom is particularly concerned that the power exercised
through surveillance has been enormously increased in recent
years by the introduction of computerized data aggregation and
manipulation that create a new threat to individual autonomy.
Thus, technology has altered the process of sorting, categorizing,
and qualifying welfare recipients. The women in Gilliom's
study experience the leading edge of the new information
state. A database innovation named CRIS-E checks and supplements information provided by an applicant. Judgments about
qualifications for benefits previously based on interviews or an
occasional home visit are now guided by information from a vast
array of federal, state, and local law enforcement, motor vehicle,
property ownership, public benefits, and court records. The
recipient whose subordination was previously negotiated with the
caseworker is now subjected more directly to the power of
higher, more centralized, less flexible administration. Technology
increases control exercised through surveillance, for now recipient
and caseworker have far less space in which to negotiate the
preemptive description of a recipient's identity presented by a
database.
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Gilliom reminds us that the domination experienced by
women subjected to this new technology of surveillance resonates
widely.
[T]he contemporary client information and surveillance system of
the welfare bureaucracy exemplifies the reductive and authoritarian ways of knowing that mark modern bureaucracies. These
systems of knowledge ... are "state ways of seeing" that place a
premium on efficiency and convenience for the execution of
policy and systematically deny local and personal forms of
knowledge or unique claims of particular people or contexts
...
they are themselves forms of domination. (41)

Subordination and Identity

Women on welfare confront domination previously explored
in a rich literature on welfare bureaucracies. In theory, bureaucracies are organized hierarchically to limit the influence of
irrelevant factors in decisionmaking according to specified criteria,
and as a side effect of their formality, individuals subjected to
bureaucratic administration are treated as bundles of abstract
qualities relevant to formal decisionmaking. Weber himself understood the potentially oppressive effects of formality. In practice, the
effects of bureaucratic administration are more varied, but no less
potentially oppressive. Hierarchical controls are imperfect, criteria
for decisionmaking are ambiguous, and, to varying degrees,
decisions are negotiated with clients rather than unilaterally
imposed. In the case of welfare recipients, who typically lack
financial means or social capital, political influence, or appropriate
advocacy skills, 3 these factors increase the potential arbitrariness of
decisions by caseworkers (Lipsky 1984; Handler 1986). 4 Nor does
the "voluntary" nature of welfare program participation limit the
real power exercised by lower-level administrators over poor

3 This is a complex problem. The ability of poor women to engage in effective formal
and rule-oriented advocacy in negotiations with lower-level bureaucrats may be limited by
class and gender differences in advocacy style, and this problem may be compounded by
low self-esteem.
4 Neither the proliferation of rules nor strong and clear mandates guarantee
accountability in welfare administration. Complex rules for welfare eligibility have actually
increased the arbitrariness of decisions (Simon 1983), while strong value-oriented
mandates have relied on the strength and content of internalization among the lowestlevel decision makers-an invitation to further stereotyping and idiosyncratic decisions
(Diller 2000).
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women who have few alternatives for maintaining themselves and
5
their children.
Overseers provides first-hand accounts of the impact of such
arbitrary power, exercised through intrusive surveillance, on those
who live under its rule. The women's narratives show that
"ongoing record keeping, observation, and verification manifest a
considerable and fearsome presence in their lives" (113). The
effects of surveillance are no passing "visitation," lest we take these
experiences as evidence only of the loss of an abstract right of
privacy. Rather, subordination to surveillance changes the women,
and the effects are complex and long-lasting. The effects of
surveillance begin with the hassle of appearing before a caseworker
to present the multitudinous forms of documentation required to
categorize and verify the recipient's eligibility. Compliance is driven
by the fear of failing to qualify, thereby risking her family's wellbeing. As one woman says, "[t]hey are telling you they need more
and more, by the time you get it in you are run so ragged... it just
makes you crazy" (59). The women are humiliated as well as
frightened by such practices. The woman explains,
[E]ven the receptionist will look at you like, "could there be
anything lower on the earth than you?" And I don't think that is
right . . . Like with me: I can't have a driver's license; I'm
disabled, so I can't not ask for it because it is what is keeping my
kids alive. (59-60)
More costly than the humiliation, degradation, and fear, surveillance affects identity. Surveillance by the welfare bureaucracy is a
form of "truth-making" (113) that denies the true identity of the
recipient. Although welfare recipients are as diverse in character
and circumstance as the human experience of society,
They must, as James Scott argues in Seeing Like a State, be made
"legible" or fit into terms, categories, and characteristics that are
observable, assessable, and amenable to the management and
information regimes of modern bureaucracy . . The state's
simplification of identity "brings into sharp focus certain limited
aspects of and otherwise far more complex and unwieldy reality
. . . making possible a high degree of schematic knowledge,
control, and manipulation." (21, quoting Scott 1998:11)
Women receiving welfare confront the state's narrowed vision
of themselves. The women grapple not only with the humiliation
and fear in what the state "sees," but also with the way
5 This paradox of perception is captured in Wyman v. James, a 1971 Supreme Court
case upholding the surveillance of welfare recipients through intrusive home visitation in
part because welfare is voluntary and, thus, a recipient is not compelled to open her home
to inspection.
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micromanagement of information about them dictates how they
are to live-without other forms of support, without contact with
their children's father, without the kinds of interdependence on
others needed to supplement meager welfare benefits.
The women resist such oppressive control through everyday,
ordinary means of concealment, evasion, and, occasionally, collusion with caseworkers. Their resistance is not a luxury; it is
necessary to continue caretaking and basic survival. Welfare has
never provided an adequate means for survival, yet welfare tries to
force recipients to give up their routines for getting by. To get by,
women have always combined welfare with other activities that
supplemented its meager benefits (Edin & Lein 1997) while
requiring them to evade surveillance-to deceive, conceal, or
misrepresent the actual conditions of their survival.
Evasion for the sake of survival demonstrates that the women
are responsible, savvy, and strategic parents, yet evasion inscribes
the morality of welfare on self-perceptions. Acts of resistance take
an enormous toll on identity, for the women know they are
breaking rules and share the common understanding that such
rule-breaking is immoral. Scott's critique suggests to Gilliom that
the state's surveillance in part frustrates the women by "miscasting"
them through its "bumbling" attempts to depict their identity in
service to the goals of welfare programs (131). Yet the influence of
surveillance is also more subtle and coherent. Like Foucault's
description of the panopticon, modern welfare program surveillance reinforces the internalization of the rightness of welfare's
patriarchal, individualistic values by making women who must
evade the rules feel guilty because they believe that they are doing
wrong.
Gilliom reminds us that the "multifaceted and diverse effects of
surveillance that we have seen here" might be discovered in
conversations with many more Americans,
...degradation, implied suspicion, the feelings of just being a
number, the anxiety over errors or subterfuges being caught, the
fear of malevolence or incompetence on the part of surveillance
practitioners, the fear of breaking rules or departing from norms
that are unknown, and, especially, need or desire to break the
rules. (124-5)
Languages of Resistance
Citizens have rights to privacy that provide a formal recourse
for intrusive surveillance. Gilliom argues that privacy rights have
proven ineffective in two interrelated ways. Privacy's individualistic
conception-the right of the individual to be let alone-is also its
greatest weakness because it is readily subordinated to greater
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collective interests. In an era of growing sensitivity to social
interdependence created by heightened threats to public security
and economic stability, privacy has been sacrificed to meet
collective demands for safer and more efficient governance that
typically transfers risks to "undeserving" individuals. Further,
privacy is abstract and impersonal rather than concrete and
contextual, and thus it misses the "complex and very tangible
effects" that surveillance and centralized administration have on
"our personal power to control our bodies, income, and behavior"
(125). Because of these limitations, privacy rights have proven
ineffective as a bulwark against the growing technological capacity
of the state to intrude.
Gilliom argues that the battle for autonomy in the trenches of
everyday life does not depend on privacy rights so much as it
depends on practices of resistance. As subjects of surveillance,
citizens learn to negotiate space for individual autonomy through
avoidance, deception, withholding, or outright violation. In
Gilliom's view, the micropolitics of such antisurveillance practices
provide the basis for a language and politics of democratic
resistance that may be more effective than the discourse of rights.
The narratives of welfare recipients have revealed the existence
of such practices even under particularly oppressive conditions.
Gilliom discovered that poor women employ "a widely shared and
principled critique of surveillance, but one that had very little to do
with the ongoing mainstream legal and policy debates about rights
to privacy and due process"(5-6). The women's "critique" is not
about the unreliability or deceptiveness of rights. Gilliom concludes
that their lack of knowledge of rights combined with their fear of
confronting welfare authorities and extreme need for the benefits
they provide greatly reduces the potential for rights consciousness.
Under other circumstances, rights might be a tool for mobilizing
and expressing their individual or collective interests (see McCann
1994), but for these women, and many like them who lack the
necessary forms of connection and support, rights remain at the
6
periphery of their consciousness.
Instead, the women's discourse emphasizes the destructive
effects of power and domination. Moreover, their everyday
struggle "acts upon and reaffirms admirable and widely shared
6

Poor women who receive welfare often have some knowledge of the rules that

caseworkers apply to them, even if their knowledge of the remedies they might invoke is
limited. Yet their ability to use this knowledge may be limited both by the factors described
by Gilliom-fear and need-and by their lack of appropriate advocacy skills. Notwithstanding such disadvantages, spaces for self-presentation in their own language and from
their own perspective may occasionally be created. White describes one such case (2002).
More generally, McCann (1994) describes contingencies that could enhance the
mobilization of rights. Gilliom describes the languages of resistance used by poor women
outside the formal settings in which rules and rights prevail.
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principles of human responsibility" (16). Their discourse about the
effects of domination and their need for autonomy foreground a
form of widely shared connectedness based on care and concern.
Through the women's narratives, Gilliom discovers that the
dominance exercised through surveillance has threatened an
interdependence based on caring relationships. The vision of
interdependence in the discourse of poor women contrasts sharply
with the dominant discourse of interdependence about security.
The interdependence of caring relationships in women's
discourse and the interdependence of physical and economic
security that dominates public debates may be equally important to
the well-being of the welfare state. 7 Fineman (1999) has argued
that all workers, and patriarchal male workers in particular, are or
have been dependent-in-fact on primary caretakers and the social
support provided by family, friends, or paid services. The
distinction between the dependency of women, who lack other
means of support for their socially important work of caregiving,
and the dependency of men or women in the workforce, who also
rely on care provided by others, is both unjust and irrational. It is
unjust because they are equally dependent-in-fact. But the
distinction is also irrational because it fails to recognize that
caregiving and care-receiving are interdependent.
Gilliom maintains that his study of those "who do not use rights
or even speak of rights contributes to the many studies that center
on those who do" (15). Gilliom's discovery of a perspective on
social relations that may alter our understanding of what rights do
has much in common with another important critique of rights,
Minow's Making All the Difference (1990). Like Minow, Gilliom
perceives that formal "rights" depend on an abstract construction
of the rights holder. The construction of identity through privacy
rights, like Minow's description of the construction of identity
through civil rights, not only fails to capture the true needs and
goals of the rights holder, but it does so in ways that benefit others.
Minow argues that traditional civil rights limit and even stereotype
women and minorities. Traditional civil rights are the product of
politics in which the worldview of dominant groups, not the groups
7 A number of recent contributions to the study of rights consciousness
among
the politically subordinate and powerless overlook the interpretation of consciousness of
the powerless as an alternative, and equally well-established, understanding of the balance
between individual and collective interests that should limit the intrusions of those who
hold power. For example, White's (1990) Mrs. G. also uses the discourse of caring to
present her case in her own voice rather than allowing her lawyer alone to speak. Her
use of a discourse of caring speaks to social interests as powerful and legitimate as those
addressed by the discourse of rights. Similarly, Ewick and Silbey's (1992) story of Millie
leaves the impression that she is an isolated individual resisting the state; in fact, she may be
drawing on a discourse that is widely shared and may have southern, African American,
and even civil rights roots.
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that the rights are intended to benefit, informs the drafting and
interpretation of law.
Likewise, Overseers addresses the politics of privacy rights and
the failure of "normal" politics to protect what is most important in
the lives of poor women. As in Minow's view, the law fails in a
formal sense. Privacy is rooted in a false conception of the
individual and ultimately leaves the individual at the mercy of
the collective interest. Like Minow, Gilliom perceives that the
remedy lies in a new politics, one that is informed by the
experiences of the dominated, by the needs of poor women and
their knowledge of the way in which the needs must be met to
achieve "equality" and an end to their poverty.8
But Gilliom's study takes us beyond Minow's examination of
civil rights. Through ethnography, he examines the effects of rights
on the lives of rights holders and the content of their alternative
"politics." Their knowledge illuminates the social relations that
are
influenced by rights and suggests means by which rights might be
employed to make those social relations more equitable and
inclusive. He suggests that we must hear the concerns of poor
women expressed in their own language rather than in the formal
language of rights. Others who share their concerns may ultimately
join, creating the potential for a true alternative to "normal"
politics.
Democratizing Welfare Politics
Gilliom's study opens the door to a profound subject, barely
explored in his book: namely, the social relations of interdependency. Interdependency, according to the public discourse of
rights, is created by risk and danger and is incompatible with
individual autonomy. Autonomy is diminished by this discourse. To
restore autonomy that will enable subordinated persons to enjoy a
full social life, we have to rethink interdependency in terms that
move beyond the limited conception that dominates the marketized state and the security state. The language of care, as well as
other languages of social concern, will lead in this direction.
Caregiving by poor mothers is important, indeed necessary.
The autonomy of caregiving women supports rather than undermines the communal strengths of social interdependence. The
circumstances of their interdependence lead poor women to
welcome benefits provided by the state-in the abstract. Research
8 Their retrospectives on the history of rights are complementary as well. Minow's
greater sensitivity to the nuances of political history suggests that the politics of welfare
state provision, and the rights that limit the power to intrude or to abuse, have more
benign potential and that the battle for the victim perspective has precedents and is not one
that must be invented.

Munger

671

such as Gilliom's shows that the conditions attached to welfare and
the surveillance required to enforce them have a counterproductive effect on caregiving. Welfare as presently administered often
makes caregiving and family survival more stressful, leaving
identity and self-esteem indelibly marked. Gilliom's concern is
heightened by the impersonalization and tightening of control that
follows from centralized data gathering and management.
Overseers leaves us with important questions to ponder. Gilliom
suggests at times that the state is always intrusive and only
marginally necessary to social life. Yet as his interviewees attest, we
have created a society in which individuals can and must depend
on benefits provided by the state. The problem is not poor
women's dependence on the state that enables caretaking-that
kind of interdependence benefits all of us; the problem is the
public perception of interdependence that excludes them and bars
the kind of provision for their needs that would permit them to
enjoy greater autonomy and thereby make a greater contribution
to society.

Locating Welfare in the Welfare State
Katz's The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare
State describes the economic and ideological sources of contemporary welfare policy. Stigmatization of recipients, onerous conditions, and harsh administration of welfare are not unique to 199 0 s
reforms. Although three icons of conservative ideology have
altered late-twentieth-century American political discoursedependence, devolution, and markets-these discourses of change
have bound the concept of full citizenship, and its mirror image,
welfare dependency, ever more tightly to the labor market. Katz's
panoramic view of welfare policy not only traces its origins but also
describes the institutional isomorphism that characterizes public,
independent (not-for-profit), and private welfare. We have to
be reminded how large the private welfare sector is and, by
comparison, how little money is spent on public programs for the
poor.9 Katz's description of the movement of all three in tandem is
particularly important.
9 Most American citizens receive their health care and retirement income as employee
benefits. This part of the American welfare state is far larger than its counterparts in other
industrial countries, amounting to nearly $900 billion in 1992, or 7.82% of GDP (the next
largest private welfare sector is Germany's, at 1.47% of GDP). By comparison, the United
States spends about $516 billion on its two largest public welfare programs, Social Security
and Medicare, programs considered the backbone of the safety net for the "deserving."
Unemployment compensation, a government insurance program covering about onethird of the unemployed in recent years, absorbs another $43 billion, funded in large part
through employer contributions. Direct public aid to the poor is a small expense beside
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Private and public welfare articulate in complex ways, reflecting their intertwined political histories and mutual support for the
private labor market. Private welfare is subsidized by the tax system
and heavily regulated. Public programs for the poor target those
excused from work because of disability or age. For those of
working age and deemed "able," they provide limited aid designed
to create a strong incentive to enter the private labor market (and
many poor categorically deemed able to work receive no aid at all,
such as poor men of working age). The independent sector has
always received a significant portion of its funding from government, which has long franchised its responsibility for the poor by
subsidizing private charities.
Histories of public welfare often overlook the interplay
between these different institutional forms of welfare. Of course,
private sector welfare-pension plans and health insurance that
became the focus of hard-won union victories during World War II
and the postwar period-is the principal source of economic
security for Americans in the primary labor sector. Further, the
sharp distinction between employment-linked welfare and public
welfare makes the American welfare state distinct among economically advanced nations and often drives its peculiar class politics
that pits sectors of the working class against one another.
Katz elegantly describes the architecture of this mixed welfare
state in an early chapter, and thereafter we are better able to
understand the historical processes by which public sector welfare
grew to meet particular welfare needs the private sector could not,
or did not want, to meet in the 1930s (including the Social Security
Act) through the early 1970s (the creation of Supplemental
Security Income). The same market forces have resulted in
downsizing all forms of welfare-private as well as public-in the
1980s and 1990s under pressure of low-wage competition in the
global marketplace.
Katz's description of the interconnections among public and
private welfare institutions suggests why surveillance practices
resonate widely among citizens of the American welfare state. The
Price of Citizenship shows us that both public and private welfare
programs have been instruments of subordination to labor market
discipline. In the 1930s and 1940s, Social Security alleviated some
competition by removing older workers from the labor market, but
these giant programs. In 1996, Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) cost $22
billion (federal and state expenses combined) but still became the target of conservative
cost-cutters who attacked programs for the poor as wasteful and misdirected government
spending. Adding food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, the Earned Income Tax
Credit, and Medicaid raises the total cost for the poor to only a fraction of that for Social
Security and Medicare and other safety net programs for the nonpoor. Public programs for
the poor are supplemented by charities-a second private welfare sector-that spent an
estimated $568 billion annually in the mid-1990s.

Munger

673

workers were denied the power to make serious inroads on
management prerogatives to set wages. Denied the most obvious
way of pursuing greater economic autonomy, they turned to
bargaining over fringe benefits, and their efforts received indirect
support from the state through regulation and tax benefits to
companies that provided private welfare. Ironically, the resulting
mixed system of public-private welfare left workers even less
autonomous, making them dependent on their employers for most
of their pension and medical benefits.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the tide has changed; employers have
successfully limited both contractual and statutory welfare, such as
employee pensions, medical care, unemployment compensation,
and workers' compensation. In many cases, the limitations have
taken the form of increased contingencies, conditions, or qualifications for coverage.
Thus, with respect to welfare in both the public and private
spheres, benefit administrators are increasingly empowered to
make inquiries about intimate life details that qualify an individual
for benefits. In both spheres, such inquiries are justified in moral
terms-benefits must be earned and may be denied if deemed a
scam for the lazy or a refuge for the unreasonably risk averse.
Private as well as public welfare policies reinforce subordination to
labor market discipline and in principle require surveillance in
order to ensure that benefits reach only the deserving. Gilliom's
research on subordination among welfare recipients takes on
greater importance in the framework that Katz creates.
Citizenship as a Discourse of Class Conflict
The Price of Citizenship introduces contemporary downsizing of
social provision across all sectors of the welfare state as a story of
moral politics and ideological change. The broader meaning given
to welfare by the New Deal-economic equity-lost ground as a
combination of political and social forces converged in the decades
after mid-century: growing power in the New South and among
conservative suburban Democrats, the exploitable backlash among
working class constituencies in the face of civil rights on one hand
and the demand for labor market flexibility on the other, a loss of
faith in government solutions, and the disappearance of communism together with the corresponding free-market triumphalism
that has greatly reduced the range of social alternatives to markets.
The rise of conservatism accompanying these changes brought
together three ideological themes that have had a powerful effect
on welfare reforms: ending dependence, devolving control of
welfare policies to local officials and the private sector, and
following the principles of the private market-in particular by
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letting the free market provide for as many welfare needs as
possible. Katz concludes that the evolution brought about by
contemporary social and political forces has worked nothing less
than a "redefinition of the American welfare state" (26).
As Katz subsequently demonstrates, this story must also be
understood in relation to the economic principles of the American
welfare state-in particular, its support of the capitalist labor
market. But telling the story this way requires a coherent account
of how moral politics is connected to the continuing dominance by
the labor market's needs. Katz shows us that class conflict-the
desire of a capitalist economy for a subservient labor market versus
the desire of workers/citizens for economic security-underlies the
welfare state. Why has this conflict never emerged in these
terms-indeed, why is "class" (like "socialism") a term that is
suppressed in American politics? A full answer is beyond the scope
of Price, but Katz's epilogue leads in the obvious directionthroughout American history, the politics of class has emerged as a
discourse of citizenship.
Late in the book, in its epilogue, Katz attempts to draw
together the loose thematic strands that link the rhetoric of market
and devolution to class politics and to conservative ideology. In a
synthesis that might well have caused him to reshape his history
if placed earlier in the book, he turns to the political theory of
citizenship. At the core of Katz's explanation of the development
of welfare policy is a theory of the economic role of citizenship.
Marshall's account of the inevitable progress toward social rights as
universal entitlements of all citizens never reflected reality, not in
Britain and especially not in the United States (Marshall 1992).' °
In America, social rights-and, therefore, full citizenship-follow
from fulfillment of the obligation to work. Full social citizenship is a
benefit derived from fulfillment of a social contract and not from
legal status as a citizen.
Because social rights are contingent upon moral identity as
a worker, full citizenship is a byproduct of the labor market. The
identity of those expected (as well as entitled) to work has changed

10 Full citizenship rights, according to the classic theory of Marshall, are the product
of a historical process of the development of civil, political, and, most recently, social rights
for all citizens. Marshall's citizenship rights are accorded to anyone who has the status of
citizen; they are not earned or achieved. Social rights, in particular, are entitlements that
protect individuals from the risks of the economy. As Katz observes, Marshall's description
of the inevitable progress of history toward full civil, political, and social rights is historically
inaccurate (Marshall 1992). Civil rights-the rights to own property or to work, and
political rights-the right to vote, have not been universal throughout most of American
history. Even when they were granted to some, they have, until recently, not been available
to all adults. Social rights have never been a universal entitlement in the Anglo-American
welfare state.
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over time. Slaves were not permitted to "work," but later, as
citizens, African American welfare recipients were required to
work. Women were historically excluded from the labor market
(except poor women) and also from full citizenship. Now women
are full citizens and face increasing pressure to work as both
welfare recipients and members of traditional households. Likewise, the moral identity of the elderly who did not qualify for Social
Security has changed. At first considered improvident and
relegated to miserly state programs, since the 1970s they have
been included in a more generous federal program. Thus, the
moral identity and labor market status of whole categories of
persons has changed, and the moral obligation to work has been
the key. Politics draws the line between deserving and undeserving,
but the rhetoric is driven by labor market expectations, and in
recent debates about reforming welfare (in the broadest sense), the
rhetoric explicitly refers to the work ethic.
This concept of citizenship further illuminates the rhetoric of
interdependence and security that justifies intrusive surveillance.
Welfare state citizenship, says Katz, "codifies our collective obligations toward one another and defines the terms of membership
in the national community" (2). Thus, citizenship is the key to the
politics of welfare reform. Reformers must seek a moral foundation
for restrictions on welfare that trump individual need because
welfare must be denied only to the undeserving, to those who lack
full citizenship. As dependence, devolution, and the market have
increasingly dominated political debate about the basis for our
mutual obligations, the moral basis for citizenship has shifted even
further, argues Katz, from social justice to market relations. The
market has increasingly become our public vision of interdependence and a basis for the benefits to which a citizen is entitled: what
the market provides is a citizen's primary source of social and
economic support. Conversely, benefits that do not meet market
tests-privately provided, benefiting only those who cannot work,
or "earned" through work-are presumptively suspect and
illegitimate. A society so-conceived increasingly subordinates
"undeserving" poor and "deserving" wage earners alike to the
needs of economic interests that dominate the labor market.
The book's ambitious conclusion-tying our incoherent and
often counterproductive welfare policies to the values and politics
of the market-is not sufficiently refined to explain all the evils
suffered by the poor that Katz wants to include in his survey. The
divisions created by racial conflict, gender, immigration, and other
sources of social cleavage have consequences of their own that are
not easily understood through class structure and labor market
policies alone. Yet Katz's illuminating story of class conflict bears an
indirect relationship to the circumstances of the urban poor,

676

Poverty, Welfare, and the Affirmative State

immigrants, or African Americans. Katz helps us understand why
the potential allies of those who are poor-the employed working
class, which shares many of the same oppressions, and the
corporations, which might find it useful to employ the urban
poor-have turned their backs on them. This is where the next
analysis should begin.

Knowing the Poor
Liberal poverty scholars, argues O'Connor in Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S.
History, are partly to blame for "bringing welfare as we knew it to
an end" (3). Conservative welfare reformers have found ample
support in mainstream poverty knowledge for making welfare
more disciplinary. O'Connor asks, how could poverty knowledge
have contributed to the oppression of the poor despite the contrary
intentions of many scholars? Among the many strengths of her
analysis, O'Connor examines the role of race more directly and
thoroughly than either Katz or Gilliom, exploring its influence on
theories and perceptions of poverty researchers.
O'Connor is surprised and angered by the support that
mainstream research has given to welfare reforms that reinforce
the obligations of individuals to perform market labor and raise
children in two-parent families, and which fall more heavily on
poor minorities. O'Connor describes poverty research as a narrowing funnel beginning from its American origins in the social
survey pioneered by Progressive Era reformers to document the
effects of poverty. Home-grown and practical, the research of social
workers was in close touch with the lives and needs of the poor.
With each step toward formalization of theory and method and
toward institutionalization of the research in universities and
institutes, poverty research became more preoccupied with
differences between poor individuals and the American mainstream and gave less attention to the institutional causes of poverty.
American social science was shaped from its early stages by the
pragmatism of the Chicago School, which turned away from
European social theories of class according to which poverty and
class conflict are inevitable byproducts of unregulated capitalism
(Simon 1999). Chicago School sociology embraced a perspective
more consistent with the faith that America is a "classless" society,
conceiving of poverty as a product of transient social disorganization, dysfunction, and individual failure, while the forces of the
market were considered an inevitable, indeed foundational, aspect
of American society. O'Connor identifies this perspective as
a problem at the core of "poverty knowledge." Poverty scholars
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have persistently focused on the capacities and competitiveness of
the poor. When they have also considered the political and
institutional sources of poverty, they have failed to develop an
effective counterperspective to the popular political discourse
about the moral failure of the poor and individual accountability;
to the contrary, they have reinforced that perspective by the
amount of time and attention they have devoted to it, making it
more complex and nuanced, but never effectively contesting its
legitimacy.
O'Connor offers an especially powerful indictment of the
ineffectiveness of scholars who attempted to advise policy makers
during the most recent welfare reforms. Perhaps most important,
economists and other poverty researchers knew that the labor
market was an important key but failed to make this point central
in their reports on poverty. Instead, poverty experts chased grants,
evaluated narrow policies, and developed "a dependency problem
of their own" (291). No research supported an "independent
policy agenda for dealing with poverty at its roots" (291). Poverty
researchers themselves created the body of theory and research
that the reformers could deploy to legitimate narrow and
contingent categories of eligibility that presume that the poor are
irresponsible and in need of discipline.
Seeing Like a Researcher
At the center of mainstream poverty research is its inescapable
emphasis on the individual. O'Connor describes the unfolding of
this theory, through its critics as well as its disciples, in the work of
both African American scholars such as DuBois and Frazier, and in
the work of majority scholars such as the Lynds, Myrdal, and
Lewis. At the center of her history lies the interplay between
inquiry and the cultural and institutional influences that shape the
professional research enterprise. Scholars such as DuBois, whose
vision suggested that poverty had institutional sources, were also
drawn to consider the culture created by persistent poverty among
social groups isolated by the mainstream. Other scholars, such as
Lewis, claimed that the culture of poverty could radicalize as well as
incapacitate individuals but were heard only to say that poverty
marked a cultural difference between the poor and the mainstream. The work of these scholars, as well as that of contemporaries who have focused more narrowly on the impact of poverty
policies, has legitimated the long-standing assumption upon which
post-World War II poverty policy has been based: that poverty can
best be addressed through programs that improve the capacities
of the individual. The culture of poverty theory reassured
the architects of the War on Poverty and the Great Society that
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the poor required job training, supplementary education, temporary income support, and other short-term benefits, while placing
less emphasis on the persistent failure of the job market to provide
jobs at a living wage and on the institutional isolation of the poor.
O'Connor vents her frustration as a former foundation
program officer with research characterized by a "narrow,
individualized focus," "technical language," "decontextualized,
rational choice models of human behavior," and a "refusal to
acknowledge the value judgments underlying measures of welfare
'dependency' (5). Most important, she argues, poverty knowledge
failed to provide a "convincing narrative to counter the powerful,
albeit simplistic story of welfare state failure and moral decline-a
narrative that, with the help of well-organized conservative
analysts, has come to inform policy discourse to a degree hardly
imaginable twenty years ago" (5).
Primary among its faults, "[P]overty knowledge is fundamentally ideological," she concludes (8). Researchers have clung to
their faith in the necessity and effectiveness of state interventions to
individuals against the hazards of capitalism through "knowledge
applied for the common good" (8). Their faith in the activist state
has encouraged members of the public to believe in the solutions to
poverty that the state created, legitimating policies that were not
supported by the actual findings.
Central to the legitimacy they have indirectly given to
ideologically oriented and empirically unfounded reforms is
scholars' nearly universal decision to focus on the individual.
Twentieth-century poverty scholars have encountered the tension
inherent in liberal theory "about the nature of inequality.., whether
it is best understood [as]... individual experience or as a matter of
institutional and structural reform (9). Both views play a role in
understanding poverty. Why then has mainstream poverty scholarship focused on poverty as a problem for individuals
rather than for the entire class of wage earners, and why have
scholars refused to contest the categories established by social
welfare institutions themselves to identify, and thereby isolate,
the "deviant" poor-for example, unmarried mothers? In their
policy research, complex cultural and social identities associated
with gender and race have been reduced to mere demographic
variables.
Part of the explanation lies in researchers' professional and
institutional commitments. During the New Deal, government
sponsors became a major source of funding for research designed
to validate (or incrementally modify) the identities and behaviors
devised by legislators and administrators to direct poverty
programs. Expertise in specialized areas using standardized
methods and data sets, using accepted theories, assured poverty
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researchers their access to funding. Professional identity included
the desire to remain "relevant" to policy arenas and eclipsed "an
alternative, more institutionalist and social democratic research
tradition" (9). 1 Likewise, professionalization increased the subordination of research subjects, already powerless by virtue of class,
gender, and race, who lacked the authority to speak for their own
poverty and instead had the "truth" about their lives imposed
upon them.
Increasingly, after World War II, an array of institutional
vendors, foundations, institutes, universities, and think tanks
funded the researchers, giving the appearance of an independent
research community strengthened by competition among diverse
perspectives. In truth, these institutions were themselves subject to
pressures that shaped the content of research, such as dependence
upon expanding government research programs, increasing
competition for funds, the desire to have an immediate influence
on those in the policymaking core, and the rise of politically
committed conservative and libertarian think tanks that eclipsed
efforts to build more complex, nuanced, and deeply researched
understandings.
In addition to the influence of professional self-interest,
O'Connor's intellectual history suggests that the tradition on which
scholars have relied is deeply compromised and has blinded
researchers to the unintended impact of their research. American
social science in its early stages suggested that that poverty arises
from social disorganization, deviance, or dysfunction rather than
from economic institutions that inevitably create inequality.
Research continues to focus on individual behavior, and whether
it shows that individuals have succeeded or failed in meeting tests
of moral worth such as work, family formation, or child-bearing,
such research inevitably reinforces the belief that poverty is an
experience outside the mainstream and an individual's responsibility. "Poverty knowledge," she concludes,
has been perhaps most effective as a form of cultural affirmation:
a powerful reassurance that poverty occurs outside or in spite of
core American values and practices, whether those are defined in
terms of capitalist markets, political democracy, self-reliance, and/
or a two-parent, white middle-class family ideal. (15)
O'Connor rejects the explanation suggested by some that the focus on the
individual reflects a disciplinary shift among favored researchers from sociology to
economics. As she correctly perceives, the favoring of a new research paradigm was itself a
result of a complex change in politics and perceptions of change that occurred in the last
three decades of the twentieth century. She concludes that researchers might have made
other choices -trivially true-but she does not confront the question of whether such
choices would have reversed the tide of institutional forces that changed the paradigm for
research compatible with the government's policy objectives.
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Although a growing body of critical research now exists at the
margins of this enterprise (see Munger 2003), most of the research
available to legislators and to the public now emanates from a
handful of institutions directly or indirectly funded by government.
This domesticated research enterprise has become an accepted
part of policymaking, and indeed, the 1996 welfare reform
legislation included funding for research to evaluate the micromanagement of recipients' lives under the new disciplinary
policies. While the research occasionally raises questions about
the emphasis or direction of program changes, report writers
almost always employ the identities and categories that structure
policy in ways that presume the irresponsibility of the poor. Such
research inevitably strengthens the perception of the public that
welfare recipients' benefits, and more generally their own welfare
state benefits, are earned through discipline- moral obligations of
"personal responsibility" symbolically owed to the community but
which are in truth the product of political choices that scholars
should lay bare.
Poverty Knowledge and the Liberal Conscience
O'Connor prescribes a dose of self-examination for researchers
who wish to avoid these compromises in the future. Scholars must
change the culture of poverty research. First, scholars must "depauperize" poverty as a social problem "by making poverty
knowledge a broad-gauged study of political economy rather than
a narrow study of the poor" (292). By examining the practices that
"shape the economy and distribute economic opportunities" (292),
scholars would treat the state as active in creating poverty, not as
merely a passive and often ineffective force for amelioration. This
change would open up inquiry into markets as social and political
institutions shaped by class, gender, and race, which would become
"legitimate 'units of analysis,' not simply ... demographic variables
" (292).
Second, researchers must reformulate the lens of cultural
analysis "to acknowledge the distorting effect of the 'culture of
poverty' and its variations in order to understand the broader
cultural dynamics that sustain, indeed encourage, social and
economic inequality" (293). The new question would "not be
about whether poor people have a cultural affinity for poverty but
about the cultural mechanisms for according status and privilege,
deserving- and undeserving-ness, social value and denigration"
(293). Scholars must cease using "stigmatizing language" that
suggests value judgments-"'hard core,' welfare 'users,' 'recidivism,' and 'intergenerational transmission' of poverty are examples of such terms that have become part of the standard
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vocabulary of scholarship and journalism alike (293). She also notes
the implications of an apparently benign term such as "working
poor," which mirrors an unspoken disparaging distinction between
workers and welfare recipients. Instead, research should be cast in
"a more humanistic and less distancing language that respects how
poor people think of themselves as citizens, workers, parents, and
neighbors" (293).
Third, O'Connor calls for "a far more diversified set of
institutional arrangements" for generating poverty knowledge. A
structure is required that, unlike conservative think tanks, which
create propaganda in the guise of research, will "generate a
genuinely independent and critical body of knowledge that aims to
set rather than follow the agenda for policy debate" (293). Of
"crucial" importance will be a commitment to overcoming the
disciplinary boundaries that, in O'Connor's own experience, have
engendered encounters between proponents of "social scientific
ways of knowing and other forms of expertise" (293).
Finally, reconstruction of knowledge about poverty should
"embrace rather than deny its inherently political nature" (294).
Scholars should expose "its usually buried interests and ideological
assumptions to scrutiny and debate" (294). This will require
rediscovering a part of the liberal tradition that has been
suppressed in the prevailing research: namely, the liberal tradition
that "has used poverty research to challenge and open up the
ideological boundaries of liberalism" and encourages connecting
"with social movements and a much broader vision of political and
economic reform" (294).
Barriers to Change

We can admire O'Connor's call for poverty knowledge to be
free from the institutional and ideological constraints that have
reduced much contemporary poverty scholarship to evaluation
research for programs that have been designed to fail. Yet her
prescriptions are couched in the broadest and most general terms,
and she provides neither details nor examples of poverty knowledge that might serve as a guide for future development of her
program. Indeed, she gives little evidence of the magnitude or
complexity of achieving the changes in orientation that she
describes. Ironically, the weakness of her history, as well as her
proposed remedies, are precisely the flaw that she finds in poverty
research itself: its lack of insight about how to change institutions
and politics.
First, O'Connor underestimates the strength of institutional
constraints on academic research, including professional standards
for merit and criteria for government or foundation funding.
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Embedded in this culture herself, O'Connor wants research to
maintain its integrity-to be "true" as well as politically effective.
She accuses conservative think tanks of worrying only about the
latter. How such effectiveness may be matched while avoiding
simplistic, or worse, propagandistic research is a serious challenge.
A massive reorientation is required, not an occasional book or
article with an alternative perspective (books by Galbraith or
Reisman notwithstanding). 12 Unless these institutional factors are
neutralized, there will be no research equal in heft to the privately
funded, ideologically guided work product of conservative think
tanks.
Second, a call for research that focuses on changing institutions
rather than changing individuals ignores the problems inherent in
choosing a perspective. Such research requires selecting a model of
political economy in which to frame new questions-and there are
many such models, especially among progressive scholars. Likewise, her third point, calling for more ethnographic research,
ignores long-standing disagreement about underlying principles
of research that distinguish positivism from interpretivism, among
other axes of disagreement. That such perspectives can be
complementary will get no argument from me, but this view is
not widely shared.
Third, O'Connor's history concerns a discourse about poverty
shared among elite academics and policy makers. This elite
discourse derives some of its content from the culture at large,
and in turn, the scholars' views have had some impact on politics
and popular discourse, although not always the desired one. But
these exchanges between elite and popular discourses do not mean
that these audiences interpret values, ideas, or experiences in the
same way. To answer O'Connor's call for research on the
construction and legitimacy of moral values at play in poverty
policy, researchers must confront the meaning (or meanings) of
"work ethic" or "responsibility" in the popular culture and in
specific contexts. How will they approach such challenging
research, and who will be their audience? While such cultural
self-examination may be morally and ethically appropriate, we
have few examples of social scientists making headway in such a
mission. I am particularly drawn to the idea that public discourse
on poverty can be refrained to make members of the public more
thoughtful about the meaning of poverty and dependency.
But poverty researchers cannot easily persuade the public to

12 A better example might be Stack's All Our Kin (1976), which has been a leader
in
sales for years among books produced for an academic market and is widely read among

policy makers.
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deconstruct such values using the traditional tools and concepts of
academic research.
Some of what O'Connor has in mind can be inferred from her
history of the Progressive Era, in which the first social surveys
of the poor and their poverty by caseworkers were linked to
first-hand experience, respect for the poor, and activism on their
behalf. Others have also found early-twentieth-century social
work a model for the production of nonstigmatizing knowledge
of inequality and difference (see especially Minow 1990). Yet
the specific conditions that permitted social workers to blaze
such a trail may no longer exist, and we know that this kind of
knowledge also has its limitations (which inspired, in part, the
methodological developments that have characterized subsequent
university-based inquiry). Her call for politically informed knowledge of the political economy of poverty must be incorporated
into a much more specific plan for conducting research in the
twenty-first century.
Finally, assuming that the hurdles of production can be
surmounted, does O'Connor really believe that policy makers did
not know that poverty was a problem, rather than moral decline?
Or does she believe that no research supported such a perspective?
At a minimum, ethnographers such as Stack, Ladner, and Liebow
and more recent reports by Edin and Lein, White, Sheehan,
Newman, and Boo have provided careful portrayals of poverty
among those who receive welfare (as well as those who don't) for
those who cared to read their work. Clearly, something besides the
research itself drives the choice made by policy makers and public
about which research to "see" and rely upon, as well as their
interpretation of its findings.
O'Connor's book is written against the backdrop of scholars'
belief in the activist state. Though she acknowledges that liberals
naively thought they could influence the state, she does not
take seriously the relationship between the production of
knowledge and its use. She well understands how researchers
have been influenced but offers no alternative theory about how
research in turn enters into administrative, legislative, or political
discourse and decisionmaking. Here the history of moral politics
and class conflict provided by Katz may suggest some alternatives.
Clearly, the force of class conflict can be directed by politics,
but within the boundaries of a discourse of the labor market, race,
and gender that defines moral identity. Scholars may have an
opportunity to influence public responses to this discourse,
but only by gaining a better understanding of its meaning
and deployment in the everyday settings in which the welfare
state is manifested to people in different walks of life in different
ways.
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Seeking the Affirmative State
Gilliom, Katz, and O'Connor examine different aspects of
welfare state evolution. Gilliom examines the increasing impact of
benefits-related surveillance on poor citizens. Katz describes the
changing architecture and the conditions that brought about

change. O'Connor describes the part played by researchers who
provide expertise about poverty to the architects. Their efforts are
complementary. Because O'Connor's conception of institutional
pressures is limited to public governance and to politics channeled
through government, she ignores the vast private welfare state
described by Katz. This larger, and largely private, institutional
structure has its own force, affecting the intuitions and ideas that
poverty researchers draw upon in precisely the way that the
Chicago School was attuned to America's vision of itself. O'Connor's intellectual history, in turn, complements Katz's by describing
one of the mainsprings of institutional continuity-poverty knowledge. She complements Gilliom's conception of surveillance by
showing that the templates for the state's "seeing" are, in part, a
product of interactions with poverty researchers. Government
administration creates a market for the research that legitimates
such templates, and what the state seeks is precisely the kind of
poverty knowledge she condemns.
I understand these books not only as responses to the evolving
welfare state but as attempts to push forward our vision of what
might follow. Here the authors part company. Katz suggests that
contemporary welfare reform violates a consensus about the
welfare state's commitments and suggests broadly that limiting
citizenship to labor market values will ultimately prove unsatisfying
to Americans. O'Connor calls for reforming poverty knowledge to
persuade policy makers (and the public) of the value of a more
redistributive welfare state. Neither describes how a new affirmative state might be constructed, and they have strong feelings of
nostalgia for a vision previously possessed but now lost. Yet their
histories should make us skeptical of any promises made by the
present welfare state. Without some new alignment of political
or institutional forces, what will change the patterns in which
welfare serves those who control the labor market and poverty
knowledge is trapped in its own cycle of dependency on culture
and politics?
Does Gilliom's discovery of a potential political voice among
welfare recipients offer another direction for the poverty research
that might contribute to democratic change and a new way of
"seeing" poverty? The state's current policies "see" a dependent
welfare recipient as a potential moral threat to the community
-threatening
illegitimate redistribution of taxpayers' property.
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Gilliom spoke with the recipients, who viewed themselves in a
different way. Recipients understood that their capacity to care for
their families, work, and lead a fully human life was closely related
to their interdependency- the support they received from and
gave to others.
Gilliom suggests that changing the state's disciplinary practices
for welfare recipients will come about only as consciousness of
resistance and new ways of seeing interdependence prevail. On a
wider scale, he says, struggle takes place in particular episodes, "in
local languages within our political culture" (117). More Americans
would join this conversation of resistance and concern if they could
use their own language and not be limited to "normal" politics.
Only then will the state respond by changing the language, and
policies, that discipline its beneficiaries.
The mainspring of this movement, as Gilliom suggests, is the
reality that increasingly effective administrative control is reducing
the autonomy of individuals, such as poor women, who perform
essential care work with (or without) the state's help. The politics
that he envisions that might be capable of reversing this trend
constitutes a new domain of public discourse, one that can vie with
rights in our national culture and restore a balance of power to
oppressed citizens seeking greater space for nurturing and
necessary relationships in their particular circumstances. But the
landscapes of local resistance and emergent national politics that
will achieve this goal, and the means by which it might coalesce
from the daily experiences of typical Americans, are left entirely
uncharted.
Gilliom's narrators only take us to the threshold of this new
political landscape. They cannot describe its contours or its
ecology-where poor women's resistance will converge with other
local languages of resistance. The question that lies ahead is how
we can transform moral politics in the welfare state by democratizing our understanding of interdependency and thereby creating a
more inclusive discourse about need.
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